A new study from Syracuse University recently revealed the shrinking numbers of fraud prosecutions since the financial crisis in 2008 (http://articles.businessinsider.com/2011-11-16/wall_street/30404680_1_prosecutions-transactional-records-access-clearinghouse-financial-crisis#ixzz1ehpr2kd9, see also http://tagesanzeiger.ch/wirtschaft/geld/Finanzbetrueger-haben-Justiz-im-Griff/story/28152529). And the New York Times already in the spring of this year raised the question: “Why, in the aftermath of a financial mess that generated hundreds of billions in losses, have no high-profile participants in the disaster been prosecuted?” (http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/14/business/14prosecute.html?pagewanted=all). It seems that a serious regulation failure exists based on wrong assumptions of what should guide the actors’ behavior.In our book we argue that today the underlying basic assumption of the dominant business model, which promotes self-interest as rational behavior, is at risk of having to be revised (see chapter 5). And we mention that already the Nobel Prize Winner Amaryta Sen reflected on the basic assumption of the self-interest of actors in his book "On Ethics and Economics” in 1987. He concludes that the idea that only self-interested values are rational is even harder to defend.
If all human beings are modeled as self-interested actors, and efficient market functioning fails to occur, additional control mechanisms of firms and their actors must exist. These are normally in the form of state laws and regulations, or in some cases voluntary self-regulation (e.g. Global Compact). A continuous need for control is all the more important as some of the actors are not interested in efficient market functioning. And it is the same actors that are also trying to annul all kind of regulations. In as much as state sovereignty is by definition limited to geographical borders, this leaves serious gaps in governmental control of this self-interest. But even a mixture of compulsory and voluntary adherence to regulation will always lag behind a constantly and swiftly changing environment. It is consequently often up to the discretion of the diverse actors of firms whether or not they exploit such regulatory gaps. Meanwhile, regulators and prosecutors are frequently not able to fulfill their functions in an adequate way, resulting in the lack of prosecutions mentioned above.To overcome this unsatisfactory situation, new mindsets are necessary: After the first waves of corporate scandals, Ghoshal claimed in his seminal paper that we have to change the basic assumption of strategic management, and that amoral business with its negative impact should not serve as a role model (Ghoshal, S. (2005). Bad Management Theories Are Destroying Good Management Practices. Academy of Management Learning & Education, 4(1), 75-91). In this context, we ask why it is necessary for firms to commit themselves to the worst forms of self-interest and to fight against an endless series of constraints, when they can focus and draw upon the stimulating cooperation of a broad cast of stakeholders for value creation? We propose as a positive approach that the potential of value creation will be unleashed through creating a sense of mutuality in networks of stakeholders, rather than through the self-interest of single parties sometimes violating regulations. Therefore new narratives about leadership are required for good management (http://www.fh-hwz.ch/g3.cfm/s_page/63500/s_name/leadershipprojekt11).