Showing posts with label Mutuality. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Mutuality. Show all posts

Wednesday, March 7, 2012


One piece of chocolate now or two pieces of chocolate later?
In the aftermath of the recent economic crisis, much has been debated about its potential causes and the lessons learned. However, it seems to me that neither from the causes nor the lessons as a starting point, a significant and generally accepted foundation emerged that could now lead the way out of this precarious situation and prevent us from future economic failure or misbehavior. Except for the obvious and the unhelpful, such post-fact evaluations leave us still wondering when the next crisis is going to happen and what it might look like.
In a recently published paper, Thomas Donaldson (2012) illuminates potential causes for the crisis from the angle of business ethics and leadership. In doing so, he also sheds a valuable light on some of the lessons that must be learned. Donaldson puts forward an argument for the ethics story behind the crisis and submits that among its causes can also be found three ethical roots: ‘Paying the peril’, ‘The normalization of questionable behavior’ and ‘Tech-shock’.
Without going to much into detail on these ethical roots that indeed go beyond the obvious and unhelpful, I came across a central aspect that is common to all of them to a certain extent – the dilemma between short-term profit and long-term value. Whether it is on an individual level, where an investment banker gambles on a ten percent annual risk of disaster in order to reap a big bonus; or on an institutional level, where banks pay salaries and bonuses to managers for actions today, even though the firm’s rewards or penalties for those actions happen tomorrow; or on an industry level, where practices become accepted that enrich the short term only to impoverish the long term, the dilemma is ever-present.
Thinking of these matters, I was reminded of an insightful TV report about the human ability to make time-dependent decisions. A simple experimental design was set up; children at the age of about 4 years were given a piece of chocolate and told that if they won’t eat it during the next 5 minutes, they get another one. The outcomes were equally amusing as astounding: except for some rebels for which the single piece seemed too tempting, the majority either managed to run down the clock without touching the chocolate (in which case they usually tried to distract themselves) or they tried to cheat, i.e., tasting the chocolate and then putting it back before the investigator returns in the hope of getting away with it. Apparently, the ability to trade individual short-term satisfaction for a future bonanza, which is by the way also found among certain animals, starts to evolve at around 3 to 4 years of age – one of the behavioral scientists explained.
Although, this straightforward comparison might tempt us to argue that the bad ethics, which led to the recent financial crisis, is occasionally part of our nature, it also and more significantly emphasizes the importance of setting appropriate incentive structures to encourage good ethics and placing more weight on collective rather than individual value. Because the most important question that remains is at what age the ability to trade individual short-term profit against future collective prosperity starts to evolve?
Marc Moser

Donaldson, T. (2012): Three Ethical Roots of the Economic Crisis. Journal of Business Ethics, vol. 106, no. 1, pp. 5-8.

Wednesday, December 21, 2011

Upper echelons

In the aftermath of the past financial crisis, a lot of people have been really upset about the greedy behavior of managerial decision makers. Especially in the financial industry top managers are still granting exorbitant compensations to each other and don’t consider the widening disparity of incomes and the problematic dissemination of value created by companies. As people got stunned about this obvious exhibition of pure self-interest and the pronounced ignorance of consequences for the society at large, they started to protest. A well-known example is the now fading “Occupy”-movement. However, public, media and even psychiatrists are wondering if those managers’ peculiar behavior is a distinctive expression of narcissistic personality traits, which accumulate in upper echelons.
As a social psychologist I am somewhat prone to take the social context into account to explain a specific phenomenon. People tend to define their self-concept not only by their individual personality, but also through relationships and memberships in social groups. Moreover, once a person perceives herself as a member of a social group and therefore identifies with it, this social identity influences her perceptions, attitudes and behaviors. Therefore, a social identity provides a person with a framework to interpret but also makes sense out of her social environment and adds to the questions of “Who am I?” and “What is my role in society?”.
If we consider the existence of an upper echelon identity, we have to assume the existence of a social group consisting exclusively of top managers. It is not very difficult to find examples of such social groups, for example during the formal World Economic Forum (WEF) or the infamous and informal relationships between members of top management in various globalized organizations. As every social group is based on similarities between its members, power, decisiveness, prestige and high salaries may are distinctive shared characteristics of top managers. If a person then identifies with a social group, those characteristics become part of her self-concept, other in-group members are perceived as more similar and, thus, generally more positively evaluated.
Coming under attack by other social groups, members of social in-groups move even closer to each other, trying to protect their social self-concept by sticking to the well-known values and norms of their shared identity, partly ignoring the concerns of their wider social environment. In the case of an upper echelon identity, the behavior of top managers therefore resembles the one of pure self-interest, described above. But actually, this behavior is not simply driven by self-interest, but also by those managers’ specific upper echelon identity and its corresponding values and norms.
To counteract the described problematic behavior of top managers, much more is needed than to focus simply on personality traits: the values and norms of an upper echelon identity have to be utterly questioned and replaced. This endeavor of changing a powerful and prestigious social group’s norms and values may can’t be accomplished by regulations, but by a paradigmatic shift from self-interest to mutuality as guiding value and shared norm.


Tom Schneider

Monday, November 28, 2011

The Limits of Regulation - A Claim for Good Management



A new study from Syracuse University recently revealed the shrinking numbers of fraud prosecutions since the financial crisis in 2008 (http://articles.businessinsider.com/2011-11-16/wall_street/30404680_1_prosecutions-transactional-records-access-clearinghouse-financial-crisis#ixzz1ehpr2kd9, see also  http://tagesanzeiger.ch/wirtschaft/geld/Finanzbetrueger-haben-Justiz-im-Griff/story/28152529).  And the New York Times already in the spring of this year raised the question: “Why, in the aftermath of a financial mess that generated hundreds of billions in losses, have no high-profile participants in the disaster been prosecuted?” (http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/14/business/14prosecute.html?pagewanted=all). It seems that a serious regulation failure exists based on wrong assumptions of what should guide the actors’ behavior.
In our book we argue that today the underlying basic assumption of the dominant business model, which promotes self-interest as rational behavior, is at risk of having to be revised (see chapter 5). And we mention that already the Nobel Prize Winner Amaryta Sen reflected on the basic assumption of the self-interest of actors in his book "On Ethics and Economics” in 1987. He concludes that the idea that only self-interested values are rational is even harder to defend.

If all human beings are modeled as self-interested actors, and efficient market functioning fails to occur, additional control mechanisms of firms and their actors must exist. These are normally in the form of state laws and regulations, or in some cases voluntary self-regulation (e.g. Global Compact). A continuous need for control is all the more important as some of the actors are not interested in efficient market functioning. And it is the same actors that are also trying to annul all kind of regulations. In as much as state sovereignty is by definition limited to geographical borders, this leaves serious gaps in governmental control of this self-interest. But even a mixture of compulsory and voluntary adherence to regulation will always lag behind a constantly and swiftly changing environment.  It is consequently often up to the discretion of the diverse actors of firms whether or not they exploit such regulatory gaps. Meanwhile, regulators and prosecutors are frequently not able to fulfill their functions in an adequate way, resulting in the lack of prosecutions mentioned above.
To overcome this unsatisfactory situation, new mindsets are necessary: After the first waves of corporate scandals, Ghoshal claimed in his seminal paper that we have to change the basic assumption of strategic management, and that amoral business with its negative impact should not serve as a role model (Ghoshal, S. (2005). Bad Management Theories Are Destroying Good Management Practices. Academy of Management Learning & Education, 4(1), 75-91). In this context, we ask why it is necessary for firms to commit themselves to the worst forms of self-interest and to fight against an endless series of constraints, when they can focus and draw upon the stimulating cooperation of a broad cast of stakeholders for value creation? We propose as a positive approach that the potential of value creation will be unleashed through creating a sense of mutuality in networks of stakeholders, rather than through the self-interest of single parties sometimes violating regulations. Therefore new narratives about leadership are required for good management (http://www.fh-hwz.ch/g3.cfm/s_page/63500/s_name/leadershipprojekt11).

Sybille Sachs