The "Yes" to the fat cat initiative and the destruction of the social contract in Switzerland

 

Switzerland was for once progressive: it said yes to the so called fat cat initiative (“Abzocker-Initiative”) which gives shareholders more binding say over company executive compensation. The day after the vote media around the world reported about the decision in the tiny country. This shows that the verdict of Swiss voters hit the nerve of an issue of global interest.

Before the ballot economic-liberal commentators of the country described the fat cat initiative as a danger for the Swiss social contract between citizens and elite which consists of a highly liberal economic regulation. They acknowledged that the dismantling of the contract had begun when the economic elite started to pay exorbitant compensations to managerial top-shots which legitimised this with a hint to realities of the global economy. They also understood that such and similar behaviour (e.g. high risk strategies of banks) completely ignored the deeply anchored culture of egalitarianism and disliking pomposity in Switzerland.

 

Despite this, the elite omitted to approach the issues appropriately. In approvals to proposals like the fat cat initiative these commentators see the price the elite now have to pay for its ignorance: a further dismantling of the social contract in the form of more economic regulation. This probably all is true. But beyond this, citizens seem to have realised that the time has come to go new ways. The worldwide interest in the yes to the initiative supports this: it shows that the issue of the behaviour of detached economic elite is not a specific Swiss concern. And the yes indeed was not primarily a yes to strengthen shareholders’ rights but a yes to stop the detached behaviour of the elite.

 

It is key that the elite realises that it can hold no longer on obsolete practices and to preserve the “ancient régime” if it wants to retain the social contract providing liberal economic conditions. Only if the elite are willing to understand moderation and the role of companies primarily to serve the society not as a local competitive disadvantage but as a global necessity the specific Swiss social contract without much regulation can be renewed.

Besides all this it would be negligent not to consider shortly the fact that the fat cat initiative reinforces the rights of shareholders. But even if one considers the enforcement of these rights as appropriate, the question about the interests of the other stakeholders stays largely unanswered by the initiative. Indeed, the initiative requires pension funds to vote in the interest of their insurants. But this alone is insufficient. Shareholders, of course, are also stakeholders. But they have specific interests and are a part of the economic elite (at least the larger ones). Switzerland has to go further down the road and the elite have to participate if it wants that the reforms do not come exclusively in the form of new regulations. Because the time is ripe for corrective measures reforms will come anyway, in either form (regulative or liberal). And because the issue is global in nature also the other countries are under pressure to reform.

 

Claude Meier

Why the Density of Regulation for Global Issues is too high today

Recently I was at a conference about finance and ethics. One of the discussed topics there were regulations in the finance industry. Although the discussion was controversial there was somewhat of an overall agreement that regulation is basically necessary but that its density today is too high. I asked myself why there is on the one hand an insight that regulations are needed and on the other hand a moaning about too much regulation?

The answer, I think, is to be found in the globalization. When the West triggered the economic globalization by national and international market liberalization and deregulations one consequence was the global integration of finance and other industries. The second consequence was that especially states in the West lost control over important political instruments for regulation. And by eliminating regulative buffers, the development of economic and financial crises was facilitated because unleashed financial streams could flow nearly without control.

Besides the political instruments already given away due to deregulation and liberalization the now established economic globalization has created new realities: according to the political scientist Ch. A. Kupchan, still state-based political instruments as e.g. financial- and monetary policies have become ineffective in a globalized world because of its inherent global competition. This all shows that states – and especially Western states which carried out deregulation more thoroughly than others – aren’t able to provide solutions (alone) for global issues as the challenges in the global financial system.

Because of this inability of states and the need to solve global issues, many international and transnational regimes and organizations have come into existence or tried to expand their sphere of activity in the past two decades (e.g. OECD, WTO, Basel III, Kyoto Treaty, GRI). They aim to contribute to solutions of global issues by providing systems of regulation. Because a global coordinating authority like a world-state is not existent, this development meant that a plethora of state and private-actors, organizations, initiatives, conferences and summits try to provide regulations concerning concrete issues.

The result is that there is a mess referring regulation of global issues today. It is not very surprising therefore that regulation concerning single issues such as e.g. unleashed finance or labour conditions in producing countries has become very dense and confusing. One even can speak of a market for regulation of global issues: different international regimes and organizations etc. offer each their “regulation-package” for one and the same issue (what leads to arbitrariness instead to effective solutions).

Because the mostly unintended lack of coordination on a global level can be seen as a central reason for the high density, it is inappropriate to speak of a willfully regulation frenzy. Thus, it is better to speak of an absence of effective regulation on the level of single states as well as of an absence of coordination on a global level, which principally would be the level on which meaningful regulative solutions need to be established.

It remains to be seen if the development of institutional structures for global governance is on the way to a necessary simplification of regulations which are at the same time more binding. Solutions are the aim to which regulations are expected to contribute effectively: this is what they are needed for. Besides, also factors such as moral, (economic) Weltanschauung or mind-set play important roles for effective solutions. But regulations are an indispensable part of them.

Claude Meier

The Limits of Regulation - A Claim for Good Management

A new study from Syracuse University recently revealed the shrinking numbers of fraud prosecutions since the financial crisis in 2008 (http://articles.businessinsider.com/2011-11-16/wall_street/30404680_1_prosecutions-transactional-records-access-clearinghouse-financial-crisis#ixzz1ehpr2kd9, see also  http://tagesanzeiger.ch/wirtschaft/geld/Finanzbetrueger-haben-Justiz-im-Griff/story/28152529).  And the New York Times already in the spring of this year raised the question: “Why, in the aftermath of a financial mess that generated hundreds of billions in losses, have no high-profile participants in the disaster been prosecuted?” (http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/14/business/14prosecute.html?pagewanted=all). It seems that a serious regulation failure exists based on wrong assumptions of what should guide the actors’ behavior.

In our book we argue that today the underlying basic assumption of the dominant business model, which promotes self-interest as rational behavior, is at risk of having to be revised (see chapter 5). And we mention that already the Nobel Prize Winner Amaryta Sen reflected on the basic assumption of the self-interest of actors in his book "On Ethics and Economics” in 1987. He concludes that the idea that only self-interested values are rational is even harder to defend.

If all human beings are modeled as self-interested actors, and efficient market functioning fails to occur, additional control mechanisms of firms and their actors must exist. These are normally in the form of state laws and regulations, or in some cases voluntary self-regulation (e.g. Global Compact). A continuous need for control is all the more important as some of the actors are not interested in efficient market functioning. And it is the same actors that are also trying to annul all kind of regulations. In as much as state sovereignty is by definition limited to geographical borders, this leaves serious gaps in governmental control of this self-interest. But even a mixture of compulsory and voluntary adherence to regulation will always lag behind a constantly and swiftly changing environment.  It is consequently often up to the discretion of the diverse actors of firms whether or not they exploit such regulatory gaps. Meanwhile, regulators and prosecutors are frequently not able to fulfill their functions in an adequate way, resulting in the lack of prosecutions mentioned above.

To overcome this unsatisfactory situation, new mindsets are necessary: After the first waves of corporate scandals, Ghoshal claimed in his seminal paper that we have to change the basic assumption of strategic management, and that amoral business with its negative impact should not serve as a role model (Ghoshal, S. (2005). Bad Management Theories Are Destroying Good Management Practices. Academy of Management Learning & Education, 4(1), 75-91). In this context, we ask why it is necessary for firms to commit themselves to the worst forms of self-interest and to fight against an endless series of constraints, when they can focus and draw upon the stimulating cooperation of a broad cast of stakeholders for value creation? We propose as a positive approach that the potential of value creation will be unleashed through creating a sense of mutuality in networks of stakeholders, rather than through the self-interest of single parties sometimes violating regulations. Therefore new narratives about leadership are required for good management (http://www.fh-hwz.ch/g3.cfm/s_page/63500/s_name/leadershipprojekt11).

Sybille Sachs